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PERCE COUNTY NO. CR 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
1 
Joseph Anthony Thomas Jr.'s appeal was originally assigned to the Idaho Court 
of Appeals, which affirmed his conviction. See generally State v. Thomas, 2014 
Opinion No. 428 (Mar. 27, 2014) (hereinafter, Opinion). Mr. Thomas seeks review 
because the Court of Appeals' Opinion is contrary to Idaho and United States Supreme 
Court precedent, decides an issue of first impression, and is necessary to resolve an 
evolving conflict with the Court of Appeals. 
1 
The State charged, and a jury convicted, Mr. Thomas for first-degree mu of 
his Beth Irby-Thomas. Mr. Thornas's jury deliberated over the course 
days for more than nine hours. The jury asked one question - whether there was any 
evidence other than Mr. Thomas's testimony that demonstrated whether Ms. Irby-
Thomas had previously engaged in erotic asphyxiation. 1 The district court had 
erroneously excluded three of Mr. Thomas's witnesses that would have answered the 
jury's question and would have allowed them to judge the credibility of Mr. Thomas and 
his defense. Moreover, the State inferred through its case in chief that it had 
investigated Ms. lrby-Thomas's sexual behaviors and led the jurors to believe that there 
was no evidence to support Mr. Thomas's When applying Idaho's harmless 
error there is verifiable proof from the jury question that the errors made in this 
case contributed to the verdict. The Court of Appeals' Opinion is contrary to Idaho 
Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court precedent. 
Mr. Thomas's case also presents an issue of first impression. Mr. Thomas 
contends that the jury question, behavior, and length of deliberations are important 
considerations in the harmless error analysis. As an issue of first impression, when 
there is incontrovertible evidence that the errors contributed to this jury's verdict, should 
the appellate court review the case, judge the credibility of witnesses, and decide 
whether they believe a jury would render the same decision. 
' "Erotic asphyxiation is the practice of depleting oxygen from the brain to enhance 
sexual experiences and arousal. This is typically accomplished by collapsing the 
carotid artery. Although the terms erotic asphyxiation and autoerotic asphyxiation 
originally had differing meanings, they have come to be used interchangeably and were 
used as such below." (Opinion, p.2 n.2.) 
2 
This petition for review also to resolve an evolving conflict with the Court of 
about the proper harmless error to apply. This Court has specifically held 
that the test articulated by Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) should be utilized 
for determining whether an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court of 
Appeals has on several occasions applied a different test. The test articulated by 
Chapman requires an appellate court to determine whether the error contributed to the 
verdict as opposed to the test that the appellate court is applying wherein it is evaluating 
whether the outcome of the trial would be the same absent the error. When utilizing the 
proper found in Chapman, this Couri should find that the denial of Mr. Thomas's 
constitutional right to present a meaningful defense and errors excluding evidence 
contributed to the verdict. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Rather than repeat the factual and procedural histories of this case that were 
previously provided in detail in Mr. Thomas's Appellant's Brief, Mr. Thomas expressly 
incorporates herein with this reference his Appellant's Brief including, but not limited to, 
the Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings and Argument presented in that 
brief. The following details are tailored for issues involving this petition for review. 
'The key issue at [Mr. Thomas first degree murder) trial was whether Thomas 
murdered his wife by strangulation or whether the victim accidently strangled herself 
while engaging in self-erotic asphyxiation."2 (Opinion, p.5.) Mr. Thomas argued to the 
Court of Appeals that his constitutional right to present a defense was violated when the 
2 For clarity, the term self-erotic asphyxiation will be used to describe engaging in the 
act alone. 
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district court excluded evidence that would have supported his theory of the 
case. (Opinion, p.4.) The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court erred when 
it excluded the testimony of Jed Fischer, Karen Cannon, and Laura Schumaker. 
Mr. Thomas is not seeking review of the Court of Appeals' proper determination that the 
district court erred when it prohibited him from presenting testimony from these 
individuals. 
Before the district court, Mr. Thomas sought permission to present testimony 
from Jed Fischer that Mr. Fischer strangled Ms. Irby-Thomas during sexual intercourse. 
(R., pp.888-889.) Mr. Thomas was able to offer proof of his testimony using the 
preliminary IJV\JCIU the State testimony from Jed Ms. lrby-
Thomas's boyfriend at the time of her death. (R., p.353.) Mr. Fischer and Irby-
Thomas had broken up about two to three weeks prior to her death and had gotten back 
to together. (R., pp.354-355.) He testified that the two had been intimate with each 
other. (R., p.353.) During sex, Ms. Irby-Thomas requested Mr. Fischer to strangle her 
during sex and he complied. (R., p.361.) Mr. Fischer had used his hands because 
Ms. Irby-Thomas had moved his hands up onto her neck during sexual intercourse. 
(R., p.361.) Mr. Fischer strangled Ms. Irby-Thomas in late November 2010 and 
February 2011. (R., p.362.) The district court prohibited the testimony finding that it 
was irrelevant. (R., pp.1016-1017.) 
Mr. Thomas was also able to offer information regarding Karey Cannon's 
potential testimony because on July 28, 2011, Detective Fuentes interviewed Karey 
Cannon, Ms. Irby-Thomas' long time childhood friend. (R., pp.448-468.) Knowing that 
erotic asphyxiation was going to be a potential defense, Detective Fuentes wanted to 
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know from Ms. Cannon about Ms. Irby-Thomas' sexual practices. (R., p.455.) 
Cannon told Fuentes that Ms. Irby-Thomas liked to be "choked out" 
during sex. (R., p.455.) When Ms. Irby-Thomas confided in Ms. Cannon about her 
sexual practice, Ms. Cannon probably gave Ms. Irby-Thomas a disapproving look and 
thus the conversation did not go much further into specifics. (R., pp.455-456.) 
Ms. Cannon also knew that Mr. Thomas was not very sexually satisfying for Ms. Irby-
Thomas and that he only cared about satisfying his own needs. (R., p.456.) 
Ms. Cannon also knew that Jed Fischer and Ms. Irby-Thomas had engaged in erotic 
asphyxiation. (R., p.458.) The district court prohibited the testimony finding that it was 
irrelevant. (R., pp.1016-1017.) 
Mr. Thomas was to provide information regarding Laura Schumaker's 
potential testimony because the detectives had also interviewed her. (R., pp.888-889.) 
Ms. Schumaker would testify that Ms. Irby-Thomas told her that Mr. Thomas would 
"choke" her during sex and that Ms. Schumaker told Ms. Irby-Thomas that she did not 
think this was a smart idea. (R., pp.888-889.) The district court prohibited the 
testimony finding that it was irrelevant. (R., pp.1016-1017.) 
The Idaho Court of Appeals found that the district court erred in excluding 
testimony from the three witnesses because "[t]he evidence excluded by the district 
court would have served to give credence to Thomas's testimony that the victim 
engaged in erotic asphyxiation in the past and that the victim was engaged in self-erotic 
asphyxiation at the time of her death." (Opinion, pp.5-6.) "Evidence that the victim had 
previously engaged in erotic asphyxiation directly corroborated Thomas's testimony that 
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the victim engaged in this practice and this made the defense's theory of how the victim 
died more probable than it would have been without the evidence." (Opinion, pp.5-6.) 
At issue, in this petition for review, is not the Court of Appeals' conclusion that 
the district court erred in precluded the testimony/evidence, but the Court of Appeals 
finding that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Opinion, pp.6-11.) 
Not only did the jurors not hear from Mr. Thomas's three witnesses, it also heard 
about about the State's investigative procedures, which left the jurors believing there 
was no evidence to support Mr. Thomas's defense. The State presented evidence from 
Detective Richard Fuentes explaining that they had to conduct interviews to investigate 
"[Ms. Irby-Thomas'] activities and potential sexual that were known by friends 
through this investigation." (Tr., p.823, Ls.20-25.) The State presented no evidence 
that they had discovered any evidence to support a claim that Ms. Irby-Thomas had 
engaged in this type of sexual practice. 
After the presentation of the evidence, the district court read the instructions to 
the jury, and the parties gave closing arguments. (Tr., p.1253, L.6-p.1367, L.19.) 
During the jury's deliberation, they sent a note to the court. (Tr., p.1368, Ls.13-14.) The 
note stated, "Did anyone other than Joe lay foundation that Beth was, in fact, into 
autoerotic asphyxiation?" (Tr., p.1368, Ls.13-14.) The court instructed the jurors to rely 
on their own memories of the testimony. (Tr., p.1368, Ls.16-18.) 
In a split-decision, the majority found the error to be harmless because "the State 
presented overwhelming evidence of Thomas's guilty." (Opinion, p.6.) Although 
Mr. Thomas did not argue that there was insufficient evidence to convict him, the 
majority summarized for several pages the facts that support the jury's verdict. 
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(Opinion, pp.6-10.) Finally, in the last two paragraphs of its analysis, the majority 
recognized the errors made in this case. (Opinion, p.11.) In finding that the district 
court erred, the Court of Appeals said, 
The evidence excluded by the district court would have served to give 
credence to Thomas's testimony that the victim engaged in erotic 
asphyxiation in the past and that the victim was engaged in self-erotic 
asphyxiation at the time of her death. 
Evidence that the victim had previously engaged in erotic asphyxiation 
directly corroborated Thomas's testimony that the victim engaged in this 
practice and this made the defense's theory of how the victim died more 
probable than it would have been without the evidence. 
(Opinion, pp.5-6.) Inconsistent with its previous findings, when evaluating whether the 
error was harmless, it concluded that value of the would have 
limited. (Opinion, p.1 ·1.) It determined that the error was unimportant in relation to 
everything else considered, essentially finding there was overwhelming evidence of 
guilt. (Opinion, pp.6-11.) In handling the jury question, the majority declared 
Mr. Thomas's argument "misguided." (Opinion, p.11.) While relying on Sullivan v. 
Louisiana, 408 U.S. 275 (1993), and Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), the 
majority concluded that a rational jury would have rendered the same verdict. (Opinion, 
p.11.) 
Mr. Thomas filed a timely petition for rehearing and a brief in support. 
Mr. Thomas expressly incorporates herein with this reference his Appellant's Brief In 
Support Of Petition For Rehearing. The Idaho Court of Appeals denied the rehearing in 
another split decision. ( See Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, attached as 
Appendix A.) Mr. Thomas filed a timely petition for review. 
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ISSUE 
Should this Court grant review, apply the Chapman test to the objected to errors, find 
that the errors contributed to the verdict, reverse the judgment of conviction, and 
remand for a new trial? 
8 
ARGUMENT 
This Court Should Grant Review, Apply The Chapman Test To The Objected To Errors, 
Find That The Errors Contributed To The Verdict, Reverse The Judgment Of 
Conviction, And Remand For A New Trial 
A. Introduction 
This Court should grant review because the Court of Appeals has decided an 
issue that has never been squarely addressed by this Court, and in doing so, has 
decided that issue in a manner that is inconsistent with this Court's precedent. This 
Court has never squarely addressed an issue of when the jury asks a specific question 
about evidence that was improperly excluded by the district court what type of impact 
that question on the harmless error test. 
Additionally, in denying the petition for rehearing, the Court of Appeals has 
issued an order which demonstrates that it is not following the Perry-Chapman 
standard, and instead, is applying an overwhelming evidence of guilt test which has not 
been adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court. Because this error will continue to be 
repeated at the Court of Appeals, it is necessary for this Court to accept review. 
B. Standard For Granting Review 
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted only 
"when there are special and important reasons" for doing so, but ultimately, the decision 
of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme 
Court. I.AR. 118(b). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered though. 
Rule 118(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of five factors, which must be considered in 
evaluating any petition for review: 
1) Whether the Court of Appeals has decided an issue of first impression; 
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Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with precedent from 
the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court; 
3) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own prior 
decisions; 
4) Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for the 
Supreme Courts' exercise of its supervisory authority; and 
5) Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further 
appellate review is desirable. 
I.AR. 118(b). 
Mr. Thomas contends that review should be granted because the Court of 
Appeals has decided an issue in a manner that is inconsistent with this Court's 
the 
denial 
See I.AR. 118(b)(2). Additionally, this Court has not squarely addressed 
addressed by the rt of Appeals. I.AR. 118(b)(1). Moreover, in its 
petition for hearing, the Court of Appeals' reasoning demonstrates that this 
Court should resolve the evolving conflict by the Court of Appeals and their attempts to 
modify the Chapman test adopted by this Court. 
C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Inconsistent With Precedent From the Idaho 
Supreme Court And the United States Supreme Court 
Mr. Thomas asserts that the Idaho Court of Appeals misapplied the harmless 
error test. Instead of utilizing the Chapman harmless error test dictated by the Idaho 
Supreme Court, to analyze whether the error that was committed in this case 
contributed to the verdict, it utilized an "overwhelming evidence of guilt" test. As will be 
demonstrated below (in Issue II), when analyzing the error under the proper United 
States Supreme Court test identified in Chapman, as the dissent did in this case, the 





v. Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified for all future appeals the 
employed in appellate review. v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 219-228 
10). Although the Perry Court could have adopted any of a number of other tests, 
utilized by the United States Supreme Court3 in deciding whether an error is harmless, it 
chose to use the test provided for in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Perry, 
150 Idaho at 22·1 ("In Idaho, the harmless error test established in Chapman is now 
applied to all objected-to error.").4 Perry appears to have recognized that "some 
opinions issued after Chapman have employed pre-Chapman phraseology"; however, 
dismisses the subsequent opinions by concluding no practical difference exists. Perry, 
150Idaho 1 
The Idaho Supreme Court reiterated the proper test in last year's opinion 
reversing a conviction for first-degree murder, explaining, 
Under the Chapman harmless error analysis, where a constitutional 
violation occurs at trial, and is followed by a contemporaneous objection, a 
reversal is necessitated, unless the State proves "beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained." 
State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598 (2013) (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 221 (quoting 
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.) The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear Chapman is the 
proper test to be used when evaluating objected-to errors. 
In Chapman, the United States Supreme Court rejected a request to hold all 
federal constitutional errors harmful. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21-22. The Chapman 
Court recognized that not all constitutional errors affect the trial or have any likelihood of 
3 "The [United States Supreme Court] has offered at least three different approaches to 
judging an error's harm." Mitchell, Against "Ovetwhelming" Appellate Activism 
Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 Cal. L.Rev. 1335 (1994). 
4 The majority in this case recognized that Perry adopted the Chapman test. (Opinion, 
p.6.) 
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changing the result; some errors are just unimportant or insignificant. Id. at 22. Instead 
automatic reversal, the Chapman Court required the party benefiting from the error 
(the State) to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained. Id. at 24. The error alleged in Chapman involved the 
prosecutor's comment on the defendant's silence, as authorized by the California 
Constitution, which violated the defendant's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights not 
to be compelled to be a witness against himself. Id. at 19. The Chapman Court 
concluded that the prosecutor's comment on the defendant's silence was not harmless 
error beyond a reasonable doubt because it contributed to the verdict. Id. at 25. 
In a case somewhat similar to the instant one, the United States Supreme Court 
was asked whether a violation of the Confrontation Clause was subject to the Chapman 
harmless error test. Delaware v. Van Arsda/1, 475 U.S. 673 (1986). The error resulted 
in the jury not hearing certain evidence because the trial court refused to allow the 
defendant to cross-examine a prosecution witness on issues of bias. Id. at 67 4. The 
Supreme Court rejected the State's request to require the defendant to demonstrate 
that had the error not occurred the outcome would have been different. Id. at 679-680. 
Instead, the Court declared that a violation of the Confrontation Clause must focus on 
the individual witness. Id. at 680. "[T]he focus of the prejudice inquiry in determining 
whether the confrontation right has been violated must be on the particular witness, not 
on the outcome of the entire trial." Id. After finding that an error existed, the Court 
rejected the defendant's requests for automatic reversal. Id. Instead, the Court held 
that a Confrontation Clause violation would be evaluated under the Chapman harmless 
error standard; however, the damaging potential of the cross-examination must be fully 
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considered by the reviewing court when evaluating whether the errors contributed to 
verdict. Id. at 684. 
The Court of Appeals erred in this case because it failed to apply the Chapman 
harmless error test. The Opinion itself starts the analysis by providing: "In this case, the 
state presented overwhelming evidence of Thomas's guilt." (Opinion, p.6.) The Court 
then proceeds to discuss what it believes to be the "[m]ost damning" testimony. 
(Opinion, p.6.) The Opinion continues to discuss the overwhelming evidence of guilt 
from its view of the facts presented at the trial for the next several pages without any 
discussion of the errors that were committed in this case. (Opinion, pp.6-10.) In one 
paragraph, the Court dismisses the errors that were committed in this case finding 
the evidence that it would have produced would have been trivial. (Opinion, p.11.) The 
Court fails to assume the damaging potential of the evidence being fully realized, and 
then evaluate how the evidence, had it been presented, could have contributed to the 
verdict. See Van Arsda/1, 475 U.S. at 684. Had the Court applied the Chapman 
harmless error test, it could not have escaped the conclusion that denying Mr. Thomas 
the right to present his defense witnesses contributed to the verdict. 
Mr. Thomas asks this Court to grant review because the Opinion issued by the 
Court of Appeals in this case is contrary to this Court's precedent. Mr. Thomas will 
further explain in Subsection F why the errors committed in this case were not harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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Special And Important Reasons Exist To Grant Review Because The Court Of 
Appeals Addressed An Issue Not Squarely Addressed By This Court 
This Court has never squarely addressed the question of whether a jury's 
behavior and length of jury deliberations should be considered in a harmless error 
analysis. (See Opinion, p.12 (Gutierrez, CJ., dissenting).) Consistent with principles 
outlined in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), this Court should evaluate 
whether the error in this case contributed to the verdict of this jury. 
In Sullivan v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court analyzed the 
Chapman harmless error test and explained why it was inapplicable to errors involving 
improper reasonable doubt instructions. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U 275 (1993). 
the Court concluded that some constitutional errors are not amenable to 
harmless-error analysis, it reiterated the proper analysis the appellate courts must 
engage in concluding that an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under 
Chapman. Id. at 279. "Harmless-error review looks, we have said, to the basis on 
which 'the jury actually rested its verdict."' Id. (emphasis in the original). The Sullivan 
Court explained that, 
The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without 
the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether 
the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to 
the error. That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that 
was never in fact rendered-no matter how inescapable the findings to 
support that verdict might be-would violate the jury-trial guarantee. 
Id. at 279-80 (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986); Clark, 478 U.S at 593 
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 509-510 (1987) 
(STEVENS, J., dissenting).) The Court then explained that because no verdict has 
been rendered when a faulty reasonable doubt instruction is utilized "the entire premise 
of Chapman review is simply absent." Id. at 280. Sullivan acknowledged that because 
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the most a reviewing court could conclude would be that a "jury would found 
petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt not that the jury's actual finding of guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt would surely not have been different absent the 
constitutional error" is insufficient protection of the Sixth Amendment violation to a jury 
trial. Id. (emphasis in original). 'The Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate 
speculation about a hypothetical jury's action, or else directed verdicts for the State 
would be sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual jury finding of guilty." Id. 
The Court of Appeals sat as the thirteenth juror weighing the evidence and 
credibility of witnesses to conclude that it would not have acquitted the defendant, 
depriving Mr. Thomas of his constitutional right to a jury trial. It violated principles 
outlined in Sullivan, in concluding that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt by looking to jurors and evidence outside of this jury trial. Mr. Thomas asks this 
Court to grant review because this Court has never squarely addressed the question of 
whether a jury's behavior and length of jury deliberations should be considered in a 
harmless error analysis. (See Opinion, p.12 (Gutierrez, CJ., dissenting).) Mr. Thomas 
will further explain in Subsection F why the errors committed in this case were not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
E. Special And Important Reasons Exist To Grant Review To Resolve The Evolving 
Conflict About The Harmless Error Test To Ensure That The Court Of Appeals 
Uses Chapman To Evaluate Whether An Error Is Harmless Beyond A 
Reasonable Doubt 
Mr. Thomas filed a petition for rehearing arguing to the Court of Appeals that it 
has failed to follow the Idaho Supreme Court harmless error test. In denying the petition 
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re-hearing, the Court Appeals 
the conflict over the harmless error 
why this Court should 
( See Appendix A.) 
review 
In a six page written concurrence to deny the petition for hearing, Judge Lansing 
wrote that the Chapman harmless error test adopted by the Perry Court does require 
the court to reverse a decision "unless the reviewing court is confident 'beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained."' (Appendix, p.2.) However, she noted that the Idaho Supreme Court has 
also recognized an "alternative standard ... phrased as whether the reviewing court is 
convinced 'beyond reasonable doubt that the result of trial would have been the same 
absent the error."' (Appendix, p.2.) Judge Lansing recognized that "If applied literally, 
the Chapman 'did not contribute to the verdict' test and the alternative 'same result' 
expression of the test call for somewhat different queries to determine whether a trial 
error was harmless." (Appendix, p.2.) She then concludes that Perry implied that the 
alternative test was really the same test. (Appendix, p.3.) 
Judge Lansing goes on to recognize that the United States Supreme Court has 
also varied its harmless error analysis over time. (Appendix, p.3.) She wrote, 
The United States Supreme Court has also vacillated between an 
approach that considers only the likely effect on the jury of the erroneously 
admitted or excluded evidence and an approach that focuses, instead, on 
the likelihood that the totality of the evidence would have led to the same 
result in the absence of the error. 
(Appendix, p.3.) In the next few pages of the order Judge Lansing elaborates on the 
different analyses the United State Supreme Court have utilized over time. (Appendix 
pp.2-6.) In a footnote, she even recognizes that the United States Supreme Court, 
itself, has acknowledged the inconsistent application of the harmless error test and that 
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strict and literal application of the test may lead to different conclusions. (Appendix, p.4, 
) 
Both in the opinion and in the denial of hearing, the majority utilizes Neder v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), to conclude that overwhelming evidence of guilt is the 
proper test. Neder, however, is inapplicable to the question at hand. In Neder, the 
United States Supreme Court was asked "whether, and under what circumstances, the 
omission of an element from the judge's charge to the jury can be harmless error." Id. 
at 7. The defendant wanted the error exempted from the Chapman harmless error test 
for reasons identified in Sullivan. Id. at 10-11. The Neder Court found that the 
"omission of an element" could be subject to the Chapman Id. at 15. When an 
omitted element is uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, 
erroneous instruction is found to be harmless because under Chapman the error did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained. Id. at 17. In Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court 
recognized that faulty jury instructions will generally require reversal except when the 
error involves one missing element and that element was both uncontested and 
supported by overwhelming evidence. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. Neder does not 
support the Court of Appeals' decision that the proper test is whether a rational jury 
would reach the same conclusion. 
Judge Lansing concludes by applying the "same result" test to determine that, 
had the jury heard the three witnesses that supported Mr. Thomas's defense and 
credibility, it would still not have believed Mr. Thomas and would have rendered the 
same result. (Appendix, p.7.) 
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In a two page written dissent to the order denying Mr. Thomas's petition 
, Judge Gutierrez would the "applicable 
harmless error standard is disputed." (Appendix, p.7.) Both Judges Gutierrez and 
Lansing recognize that there are conflicting tests and the application of those tests 
would render different results. (See Appendix A.) 
Mr. Thomas asks this Court to grant review to resolve the evolving conflict 
regarding the proper application of the harmless error test. Mr. Thomas will further 
explain in Subsection F why the errors committed in this case were not harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Errors Committed In This Case Were Not Harmless Beyond A Reasonable 
Doubt And This Court Should Vacate The Judgment 
Mr. Thomas contends that the errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt regardless of what interpretation of the harmless error test this Court adopts. 
Because there was a timely objection, Mr. Thomas only has the duty to prove that an 
error occurred, "at which point the State has the burden of demonstrating that the error 
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Perry, 150 Idaho at 222. The State cannot 
show that "the error[s] complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." 
Almaraz, 154 Idaho at 59 (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 221 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 
24.) 
'The key issue at [Mr. Thomas' first degree murder] trial was whether Thomas 
murdered his wife by strangulation or whether the victim accidently strangled herself 
while engaging in self-erotic asphyxiation." (Opinion, p.5.) The jury deliberated for over 
nine hours. (Tr., p.1367, Ls.18-22, R., pp.1199, 1368-1369, see also Opinion, pp.12-14, 
18 
CJ, dissenting.)) During the deliberations, the jury asked the court the 
question, "Did anyone other than Joe lay foundation that Beth 
autoerotic asphyxiation?" (Tr., p.1368, Ls.13-15.) 
in fact, into 
A proper application of the controlling case law requires the appellate courts to 
look this jury and determine whether the error would have affected this jury's 
determination. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279-280. "Consistent with the jury-trial guarantee, 
the question it instructs the reviewing court to consider is not what effect the 
constitutional error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but 
rather what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand." Id. at 279. "To 
hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered no matter how 
inescapable the findings to support the verdict might be would violate the jury-trial 
guarantee." Id. 
The jurors that sat in this case were all qualified, both counsel and the court 
determined that each of them were unbiased, and after being selected they were sworn 
to follow the law. To imply now that the juror or jurors who asked a question about 
evidence that should have been admitted in this case is unreasonable calls into 
question the fairness of the entire proceeding because this Court has deemed either 
one or all of the members of this jury to be unreasonable. Either we take the jurors that 
sat in this case and give weight to their questions and find that the errors committed in 
this case did contribute to the verdict or we find the jurors were unqualified to sit on the 
jury and grant Mr. Thomas a new trial. We have tangible evidence in this case that the 
errors committed did in fact contribute to this verdict in this case. 
19 
The jury found it important enough to stop deliberations and ask the court the 
evidence if it would have been admitted, could have answered their 
question. (Tr., p.1368, Ls.9-20.) The jury question went to an ultimate issue in 
controversy, whether to believe Mr. Thomas in that he did not kill Ms. Irby-Thomas and 
conclude that she injured herself. The jurors were weighing in on Mr. Thomas's 
credibility. 
The Court of Appeals found that the district court erred in excluding testimony 
from the three witnesses because "[t]he evidence excluded by the district court would 
have served to give credence to Thomas's testimony that the victim engaged in erotic 
asphyxiation in the past and that the victim was engaged in self-erotic asphyxiation at 
the time of her death." (Opinion, pp.5-6.) "Evidence that the victim had previously 
engaged in erotic asphyxiation directly corroborated Thomas's testimony that the victim 
engaged in this practice and this made the defense's theory of how the victim died more 
probable than it would have been without the evidence." (Opinion, pp.5-6.) 
The State had presented evidence that they looked into Ms. Irby-Thomas' sexual 
practices. (Tr., p.823, Ls.20-25.) However, they did not present any evidence that she 
engaged in this conduct; and the defense was prohibited from doing so. (R., pp.616-
617, 881-882, 1016-1017.) The jurors were left with the belief that no evidence 
confirmed Mr. Thomas' testimony. The jurors were considering Mr. Thomas' defense as 
is evidenced by their jury question. (Tr., p.1368, Ls.13-14.) The jurors wanted to know 
if Ms. Irby-Thomas engaged in erotic asphyxiation, and were told to rely on their own 
memories. (Tr., p.1368, Ls.13-18.) However, there was no evidence other than 
Mr. Thomas' testimony because the district court refused to allow Mr. Thomas to 
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the testimony from Jed Fischer, Karey Cannon, and Laura 
The State will to nr-r,-,-,,.A the error in this case was 
harmless. 
The precluded evidence was relevant to Mr. Thomas' defense. It was relevant to 
how Ms. Irby-Thomas injured herself. It was consistent with the testimony 
provided by Mr. Thomas and was the question at issue before the jury. The failure to 
admit the evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Perry, 150 
Idaho at 227, see also, Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 
What the Court of Appeals has done in its analysis is weighed the evidence 
presented at the trial, sitting as thirteenth juror, concluded that, had it the 
excluded evidence, it would not have rendered an acquittal. This is not the test dictated 
by Chapman or the Idaho Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals lacks the benefit of 
being able to judge the credibility of the witnesses. And as the Court of Appeals did 
conclude, "The evidence excluded by the district court would have served to give 
credence to Thomas's testimony that the victim engaged in erotic asphyxiation in the 
past and that the victim was engaged in self-erotic asphyxiation at the time of her 
death." (Opinion, p.5.) The error in this case had a direct impact on the credibility 
determination of the witnesses testifying at trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Thomas that this grant review, the 
Chapman to the objected to errors, find that the errors contributed to the verdict, 
reverse the judgment of conviction, and remand the matter for a new trial. 
DATED this 23rd day of June, 2014. 
EM. WALK R 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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The Court has received and reviewed the appellant's petition and brief for rehearing. 
After due consideration, the petition is hereby DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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Judge LANSING, CONCURRING IN THE ORDER 
I write to explain why I disagree with Thomas's analysis of the hannless error standard 
presented in his brief in support of the petition for rehearing. 
As Thomas points out, in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), the Idaho 
Supreme Court adopted the standard that was stated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), for harmless error review. The Chapman standard 
requires reversal unless the reviewing court is confident "beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Id. at 24. The Perry Court held 
that this standard would henceforth be applied to all objected-to error. Peny, 150 Idaho at 221, 
245 P.3d at 973. The Perry decision recognized that Idaho appellate courts had sometimes 
employed "pre-Chapman phraseology" when stating the applicable standard, as in State v. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,265, 923 P.2d 966, 972 (1996), where the query was phrased as whether 
"the evidence of the defendant's guilt is proven and is such as ordinarily produces moral 
certainty or conviction in an unprejudiced mind, and the result would not have been different had 
an error in the trial not been committed." See Perry, 150 Idaho at 221-22, 245 P.3d at 973-74. 
This alternative standard was also sometimes phrased as whether the reviewing court is 
convinced "beyond a reasonable doubt, that the result of trial would have been the same absent 
the error." State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010). Accord 
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 716, 215 PJd 414, 436 (2009); State v. Hodges, 105 Idaho 
588, 592, 671 P.2d 1051, 1055 (1983); State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359, 368, 972 P.2d 737, 746 
(Ct. App. 1998). 
If applied literally, the Chapman "did not contribute to the verdict" test and the 
alternative "same result" expression of the test call for somewhat different queries to detennine 
whether a trial error was harmless. That is, the Chapman language focuses on the effect that the 
erroneously admitted or excluded evidence could have had on the jury, while the "same result" 
test focuses on the effect of the untainted evidence, i.e., whether it would have led the jury to the 
same verdict if the error had not occurred. In Perry, our Supreme Court concluded, however, 
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that the alternative phraseology "is so similar analytically to the standard employed under 
Chapman, that there is no practical difference." Perry, 150 Idaho at 222,245 P.3d at 974. 
While purporting to apply only the Chapman test, the United States Supreme Court has 
also vacillated between an approach that considers only the likely effect on the jury of the 
eIToneously admitted or excluded evidence and an approach that focuses, instead, on the 
likelihood that the totality of the evidence would have led to the same result in the absence of the 
error. In Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), after finding that the defendant's 
confrontation rights had been violated, the Supreme Court described the proper ham1less errnr 
analysis as follows: 
Whether such an error is hannless in a particular case depends upon a host of 
factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts. These factors include the 
importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the 
testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or 
contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-
examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the 
prosecution's case. 
Id at 684. Thus, the Supreme Court endorsed examining the weight and significance of the 
remaining evidence, not just the subjective effect that the eIToneously excluded evidence might 
have had on the jury, in conducting a harmless error analysis. 1 
In Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988), the Supreme Court stated that the Chapman 
test is not "whether the legally admitted evidence was sufficient to support" a conviction but 
"whether the State has proved 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict."' Id at 258-59 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). But in Harrington 
v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253-54 (1969), while expressly confirming that the Chapman test is 
appropriate, the Court held that an error was harmless because the untainted evidence of guilt 
was "overwhelming." Justice Brennan, dissenting, asserted that the majority opinion thereby 
Thomas relies upon Van Arsdall to support his contention that this Court misapplied the 
Chapman test, but the language he quotes is not from the section of the Van Arsdall opinion that 
describes the harmless error standard. Rather, it is from the opinion's analysis of what must be 




"shit1[ ed] the inquiry from whether the constitutional error contributed to the conviction to 
whether the untainted evidence provided 'overwhelming' support for the conviction," id at 255, 
and that this approach "was expressly rejected in Chapman." Id at 256. Justice Brennan stated 
that the majority's inquiry "concerns the extent of accumulation of untainted evidence" while his 
inquiry concerns "the impact of tainted evidence on the jury's decision." Id at 256.2 
Also of significance is the harmless error discussion in Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 
(1991), disapproved on other grounds by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). After holding 
that the trial court erred in giving an instruction that allowed the jury to presume malice from the 
use of a deadly weapon, the Supreme Court's description of the applicable harmless error 
analysis included the fi)llowing: 
To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that 
error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in 
question, as revealed in the record. Thus, to say that an instruction to apply an 
unconstitutional presumption did not contribute to the verdict is to make a 
2 As Justice Brennan's dissent in Harrington illustrates, strict and literal application of the 
two expressions of the test can lead to different conclusions as to whether the trial error was 
harmless. An illustrative circumstance where different conclusions may be dictated by the 
different emphases of the two tests is posited in Linda E. Carter, The Sporting Approach to 
Harmless Error in Criminal Cases: The Supreme Court's "No Harm, No Foul" Debacle in 
Neder v. United States, 28 Am. J. Crim. L. 229,243 (2001): 
Suppose that there is a rape-murder prosecution in which the evidence admitted at 
trial includes: the defendant's DNA, found at the scene of the crime; his 
fingerprints, found everywhere at the scene; the fact that he was the victim's 
estranged husband and jealous of her relationship with another man; the fact that 
he had threatened her; and his confession to the crime. Now assume that, on 
appeal, the confession is found to be unconstitutionally coerced. If the question is 
whether there is enough evidence without the confession to conclude that the jury 
would have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the answer is 
probably yes. If, however, the question is whether the erroneously admitted 
confession contributed to the verdict in a significant way, it is much more difficult 
to conclude that the error was harmless. The confession was probably a highly 
important piece of evidence to the jury, as the defendant's own words. In that 
case, the confession most certainly "contributed" to the verdict, even though there 
is a significant amount of properly admitted evidence. 
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judgment about the significance of the presumption to reasonable jurors, when 
measured against the other evidence considered by those jurors independently of 
the presumption. 
[T]he issue under Chapman is whether the jury actually rested its verdict on 
evidence establishing the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt, 
independently of the presumption. Since that enquiry cannot be a subjective one 
into the jurors' minds, a court must approach it by asking whether the force of the 
evidence presumably considered by the Jwy in accordance with the instructions is 
so overwhelming as to leave it beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict resting 
on that evidence would have been the same in the absence of the presumption. It 
is only when the effect of the pn:sumption is comparatively minimal to this 
degree that it c,m be said, in Chapman's words, that the presumption did not 
contribute to the verdict rendered. 
Yates, 500 U.S. at 404-05 (emphasis added). "TTms, in Yates, the Court was clearly examining 
whether a rational jury would undoubtedly have rendered the same verdict in the absence of the 
error. 
In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), it appears that the Court sought to 
harmonize the two tests and treat them as the same inquiry. The Court there asserted that it was 
applying the Chapman test "because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact 
rendered--no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be--would violate 
the jury-trial guarantee," but the Court then went on to note that the correct inquiry is "whether 
the same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt would have been rendered absent the 
constitutional error." Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279-80. The Court reconciled the two tests by 
explaining that the question is not whether, "a jury would surely have found petitioner guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt" but whether "the jury's actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt would surely not have been different absent the constitutional error." Id. at 280. 
Then in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999), the Court, still purporting to apply 
the Chapman test, stated the relevant inquiry as: "Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?" (Emphasis added.) The 
Court concluded in that case that the evidence on an element of the offense that had been omitted 
from the jury instructions was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence such that 
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"the jmy verdict would have been the same absent the error." Therefore, the Comi said, it was 
"beyond cavil here that the error 'did not contribute to the verdict obtained."' Id. at 17 (quoting 
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). In arriving at this decision, the Court stated that this type of harmless 
error review does not infringe the defendant's right to have his guilt determined by a jury: 
A reviewing court making this harmless-error inquiry does not, as Justice 
Traynor put it, "become in effect a second jury to determine whether the 
defendant is guilty." Rather, a court, in typical appellate-co mt fashion, asks 
whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary 
finding with respect to the omitted element. If the answer to that question is "no," 
holding the error harmless does not "reflec[t] a denigration of the constitutional 
rights involved." 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 19 (internal citations omitted). Hence, in Neder, the Court applied an 
objective test, asking what verdict would have been rendered by a rational jury if the error had 
not occurred. See also Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212,213 (2006) (following the Neder 
approach); 7 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMJNAL PROCEDURE § 27.6(e) (3d ed. 2007) 
( observing that the most recent United States Supreme Court opinions follow the approach of 
"asking what the outcome would have been had the trial error not occurred" rather than applying 
the Chapman test "assessing the effect of the error on the trial that took place"); Brent M. Craig, 
"What Were They Thinking? "--A Proposed Approach to Harmless Error Analysis, 8 FLA. 
COASTAL L. REV. 1, 9 (2006) (asserting that the United States Supreme Court has 'jump[ed] 
around; at times using the pure Chapman test of whether the constitutional error contributed to 
the verdict, and at other times appl[ying] the Harrington test of whether, notwithstanding the 
error, there was overwhelming evidence to convict the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
In light of the United States Supreme Court's continued use of the "same result" test 
rather than a literal application of the Chapman language in its most recent decisions, I conclude 
that the Chapman hannless error standard does not require reversal if the reviewing court can 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury's finding of guilt "would surely not have 
been different absent the ... error." Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280. 
I also find support for that conclusion in Idaho Supreme Court decisions. In Perry, the 
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difference." Perry, 150 Idaho at 222, 245 P.3d at 974. Subsequently, in State v. Almaraz, 154 
Idaho 584, 598, 30 I P.3d 242,256 (2013), the Court said that upon a finding of evidentiary error, 
"the Court must declare a belief beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the 
outcome of the trial, in order to find that the error was harmless and not reversible. In other 
words, the enor is hannless if the Court finds that the result would be the same without the 
error." Id (internal citations omitted). 
Accordingly, I am not persuaded that the majority opinion in this case was incorrect in its 
harmless error analysis which focused lasgely upon whether, if the eIToncously excluded 
evidence had been admitted, a reasonable jury viewing the totality of the evidence could have 
reached a different verdict. 
Chief Judge GUTIERREZ, DISSENTING li'ROM THE ORDER 
I respectfully dissent from the order of the Court denying Thomas's petition for 
rehearing. I would grant the petition for rehearing because the applicable harmless error 
standard is disputed. 
Judge Lansing's articulate concurrence demonstrates why Thomas's petition for 
rehearing should be granted. As the concurrence enunciates, the United States Supreme Court 
has, thus far, not consistently articulated the Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), 
harmless error analysis. Even the Idaho Supreme Court has provided seemingly inconsistent 
standards in State v. Parker, Docket No. 38956 (Apr. 4, 2014), petition for reh 'g filed, a case 
decided after we issued our decision in this appeal. Moreover, it is not apparent from the 
majority opinion in Thomas's appeal which standard the majority applied because the majority 
cites and quotes the Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), interpretation of Chapman 
harmless error, but later references Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999). Therefore, I 
would grant the petition for rehearing to address the proper formulation of the harmless error 
analysis. 
Judge Lansing proposes that "the Chapman harmless error standard does not require 
reversal if the reviewing court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury's 
finding of guilt 'would surely not have been different absent the ... error'" ( quoting Sullivan, 
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analysis, I would still hold that the Court cannot conclude beyond a 
rational jury's verdict would surely not have been difterent if 
error 
that a 
were admitted. This 
is because a rational juP/ would have to make a credibility determination concerning Thomas's 
testimony--the main issue at trial--based on the additional evidence that would have added 
veracity to Thomas's testimony. 
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